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Summary findings
To estimate the relationship between household wealth  on state domestic product and on state level poverty
and the probability that a child (aged 6 to 14) is enrolled  rates.
in school, Filmer and Pritchett use National Family  They validate the asset index using data on
Health Survey (NFHS) data collected in Indian states in  consumption spending and asset ownership from
1992 and 1993.  Indonesia, Nepal, and Pakistan. The asset index has
In developing their estimate Filmer and Pritchett had  reasonable coherence with current consumption
to overcome a methodological difficulty: The NFHS,  expenditures and, more importantly,  works as well as -
modeled closely on the Demographic and Health  or better than - traditional expenditure-based  measures
Surveys, measures neither household income nor  in predicting enrollment status.
consumption expenditures. As a proxy for long-run  The authors find that on average a child from a
household wealth, they constructed a linear "asset index"  wealthy household (in the top 20 percent on the asset
from a set of asset indicators, using principal components  index developed for this analysis) is 31 percent more
analysis to derive the weights.  likelv to be enrolled in school than a child from a poor
This asset index is robust, produces internally coherent  household (in the bottom 40 percent).
results, and provides a close correspondence with data
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Introduction
This paper has an empirical and overtly methodological goal. We propose and
defend a method for estimating the effect of household economic status on educational
outcomes without direct survey information on income or expenditures.  We construct an
index based on indicators of household assets, solving the vexing problem of choosing
the appropriate weights by allowing them to be determined by the statistical procedure of
principal components.  While the data for India cannot be used to compare altermative
approaches we use data from Indonesia, Nepal, and Pakistan which have both
expenditures and asset variables for the same households.  With these data we show that
not only is there a correspondence between a classification of households based on the
asset index and consumption expenditures but also that the evidence is consistent with tne
asset index being a better proxy for predicting enrollments--apparently less subject to
measurement error for this purpose--than consumption expenditures.
This rnethodology of constructing an index of household economic status based
on an asset index built from weights chosen by principal components is of potentially
broad application.  Nearly identical DHS (and NFHS) surveys have been carried out in
We would  like  to thank Harold  Alderman,  Zoubida  Allaoua,  Gunnar  Eskeland,  Jeffrey  Harnmer,  Keith
Hinchliffe,  Valerie  Kozel,  Alan Krueger,  Peter  Lanjouw,  Marlaine  Lockheed,  Berk Ozler,  and Martin
Ravallion  for valuable  comments  and discussions.  This  research  was funded  in part through  a World
Bank  research  support  grant  (RPO  682-11).
2over 35 countries with information on assets but not consumption expenditures.'  A
consistent method for estimating household wealth from these surveys allows
comparisons across countries in the wealth gaps between countries for a range of socio-
economic outcomes. A companion paper uses the asset index to examine wealth gaps in
educational attainment in 35 countries (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998a). This method allows
an examination of differences in health outcomes and health care utilization across wealth
groups from DHS data (Hammer, 1998). In addition, this method can be applied in
studies of fertility and family planning usage.  Beyond its use to estimate wealth effects
on outcomes, the index is also a convenient control for household economic status.
When examining the effects of other factors (such as maternal education on child health)
one needs to control for household economic status and the method proposed provides a
simple technique for doing so.
I)  The NFHS data:  Creating an Index
The National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) data, collected in 1992 and 1993
present both an opportunity, as well as a challenge. The opportunity is a set of surveys
that followed nearly identical questionnaires for each Indian state with large samples
designed to be representative at the state level. 3 The number of households surveyed in
each state varied from  9,963 in Uttar Pradesh to around 1,000 in the small northeastern
states.  Overall, the survey covered over 88,000 households and about half a million
2 With  the exception  of the 1994  Indonesian  DHS.
3 The  NFHS  surveys  were modeled  closely  on the Demographic  and Health  Surveys  (DHS) of which  there
have been  almost  a hundred  carried  out in over  50 developing  countries  over  the past two  decades.
3individuals.
An educational  history  was obtained  for each household  member. 4 For each
member  the survey  asked  whether  they had ever  been  to school,  the highest  grade
attended,  and, for members  less than 15  years old, if they were still in school.
The major challenge  is that a household's  economic  status is undoubtedly  an
important  determinant  of enrollment,  yet the NFHS did not collect  information  on either
household  income  or consumption  expenditures.  However,  the NFHS did inquire  about
household  ownership  of various  assets and characteristics  of the household's dwelling.
We use twenty-one  of these  asset variables,  which  can be grouped  into three types. First,
eight  variables  about  household  ownership  of certain  consumer  durables  (clock/watch,
bicycle,  radio, television,  bicycle, sewing  machine,  refrigerator,  car). Second,  twelve
variables  describing  characteristics  of the household's  dwelling  (three  about  toilet
facilities,  three about  the source  of drinking  water,  two about rooms  in the dwelling,  two
about  the building  materials  used, and one each about  the main source  of lighting  and
cooking). Third,  a variable  about  whether  the household  owned  more than 6 hectares  of
land.
These  variables  can be used to create  an index of assets  that proxies for household
"wealth" or economic  status. We limit  our problem  in this paper  to forming  a linear
index of these  asset variables  to use as a proxy for household  wealth  in explaining  school
enrollment. Even within  these limits choosing  weights  is a hard problem. There are three
solutions  that have  been used in the literature. First, equal  weights  of all the assets,  which
4  Households without an woman eligible for the female questionnaire are still included in the part of the
household survey which includes the education questions.
4has as its only  appeal  not seeming  as completely  arbitEary  as it really  is. The second
possible  solution  is to impose  a set of weights. For instance,  prices  of various assets
could  be used to construct  an index  of household  wealth,  but this is possible  only if the
prices  of various  assets are available. 5
A third solution  is to not construct  an index but simply  enter  all asset variables
individually  in a multivariate  regression  equation. This is the approach  recommended  in
Montgomery,  Burke,  Paredes  and  Zaidi (1997)  for use in fertility  or mortality  regressions
using DHS data. This approach  does handle  the problem  of "controlling"  for wealth  in
estimating  the impact  of non-wealth  variables. However,  as recognized  by Montgomery
et al (1997),  it does not identify  the wealth  effect  as many  assets play a both a direct  and
an indirect  effect  on outcomes. For instance,  the household's  use of electricity  for
lighting  may  have a role both as a proxy for wealth  but also have the effect  of making
study easier and hence  lower  the opportunity  costs of schooling. Or the availability  of
piped water  may  both indicate  greater  wealth  but also reduce  water collection  times and
lower  the relative  cost of schooling. There is no way  to infer  from the unconstrained
coefficients  on the asset variables  from a multivariate  regression  the impact  of an increase
in wealth. Hence,  while in some sense  a regression  coefficients  produce  a linear  "index"
of the asset variables  (that  which  best predicts  the dependent  variable)  this "index"  cannot
be interpreted  as the effect  of an increase  in wealth.
5While  this is a desirable  solution  and is done  as part of estimating  total consumption  expenditures  in
surveys  such as the LSMS,  asset  prices  were not collected  in connection  with  the DHS  or NFHS  and
hence is impossible here.
5A)  Using  principal components
We implement a different approach: we use the statistical procedure of principal
components (which is closely related to factor analysis) to determine the weights for an
index of the asset variables.  Intuitively, principal components is technique for extracting
from a large number of variables those few orthogonal linear combinations of the
variables that best capture the common information. The first principal component is the
linear index of variables with the largest amount of information common to all of the
variables.
The result of principal components is an asset index is for each household (Aj)
based on the formula:
Aj = fl x (a,- a,) / (s,) +....  + fNx (ajN-  aN)  / (SN)
where f 1 is the "scoring factor" for the first asset as determined by the procedure, aj 1 is the
j  th household's value for the first asset and a, and s, are the mean and standard deviation
of the first asset variable over all households.  Our crucial assumption, and it is just that,
an assumption, is that household long-run wealth is what causes the most common
variation in asset variables.
The mean value of the index is zero by construction.  The standard deviation in
this case is 2.3.  Since all the asset variables (except "number of rooms") take only the
values of zero or one, the weights have an easy interpretation. A move from 0 to 1
changes the index by fi/si. A household that owns a clock has an asset index higher by
.54 than one that does not.  Owning a car raises a household's asset index by 1.21 units.
Using biomass for cooking lowers the index by .67.
6Using this index each household is assigned to the bottom 40 percent, the middle
40 percent, or top 20 percent of households in all of India. 6 Purely for expository
convenience, we will refer to these as the poor, the middle and the rich, asking the reader
to keep firmly in mind that this is not following any of the usual definitions of  "poverty"
and that we are not proposing the asset index for use in poverty analysis or as a proxy for
current living stanclards.
Table 1: Scoring factors and summary statistics for variables entering the computation of the
first principal component
All India  Mean
Scoring  Poorest  Middle  Richest
Scoring  Mean  Std.  factor - 40  40  20
factors  Dev.  Std.  percent  percent  percent
Dev.
Own clock/watch  0.270  0.533  0.499  0.54  0.164  0.739  0.985
Own bicycle  0.130  0.423  0.494  0.26  0.264  0.510  0.621
Own radio  0.248  0.396  0.489  0.51  0.101  0.522  0.838
Own television  0.339  0.209  0.407  0.83  0.000  0.127  0.866
Own sewing machine  0.253  0.182  0.385  0.66  0.015  0.179  0.580
Own motorcycle/scooter  0.249  0.082  0.274  0.91  0.001  0.031  0.375
Own refrigerator  0.261  0.068  0.252  1.04  0.000  0.006  0.353
Own car  0.129  0.012  0.107  1.21  0.000  0.001  0.059
Drinking water from pump/well  -0.192  0.609  0.488  -0.39  0.800  0.569  0.242
Drinking water from open source  -0.041  0.040  0.195  -0.21  0.057  0.036  0.005
Drinking water from other (non-piped) srce  -0.002  0.019  0.138  -0.01  0.016  0.027  0.012
Flush toilet  0.308  0.217  0.412  0.75  0.005  0.175  0.797
pit toilet/latrine  0.040  0.086  0.280  0.14  0.040  0.127  0.111
none/other toilet  0.001  0.001  0.029  0.03  0.001  0.001  0.001
main source of lighting electric  0.284  0.510  0.500  0.57  0.143  0.700  0.989
Number of rooms in dwelling  0.159  2.676  1.957  0.08  1.975  2.965  3.739
kitchen isaseparate  room  0.183  0.536  0.499  0.37  0.312  0.643  0.848
main cooking fuel is wood/dung/coal  -0.281  0.776  0.417  -0.67  0.956  0.841  0.224
dwelling all high quality materials  0.309  0.237  0.425  0.73  0.005  0.218  0.821
dwelling all low quality materials  -0.273  0.483  0.500  -0.55  0.832  0.308  0.017
own >6 acres land  0.031  0.115  0.319  0.10  0.075  0.155  0.126
Economic status index  0.000  2.32  -2.00  0.071  3.857
.. .......................  ..  - ................  ....  ........  .... .........................  . ...........  .....  .... _..  ...  -.  ......................  ................  .. ...................  I..........---------  - -----  ------------
Note: Each variable besides number of rooms takes the value I if true, 0 otherwise. Scoring factor is the "weight'  assigned to
each variable (normalized by its mean and standard deviation) in the linear combination of the variables that constitute the
first principal component. Source: Authors'  calculations from NFHS 1992-93
The difference in the average index between the poor and middle is 2.07 units.
6  Cutoff  points  for these  quantiles  were  based  on a ranking  of individuals,  that  is the bottom  40 percent
refers  to the househiolds in which the bottom  40 percent  of people  live.
7One example  of a combination  of assets that would  produce  this difference  is owning  a
radio (.54),  having  a kitchen  as a separate  room  (.37),  having  electricity  for lighting  (.57),
and having  a dwelling  not of all low quality  materials  (-.55). The richest  20 percent  have
a wealth  index almost  four units higher  than the middle 40. This additional  difference  is
equivalent  to owning  a motor scooter  (.91),  a television  (.83), having  a flush toilet (.75), a
house of all high quality  materials  (.73) and not using  biomass  as a cooking  fuel (.67).
B) The  reliability  of the asset index
The asset index  for India does well  in three  dimensions:  first, it is internally
coherent  and  produces  clean  separations  across  the poor, middle  and rich households  for
each asset individually,  second,  it is robust  to the assets included,  third, it produces
reasonable  comparisons  with poverty  and output across  states. However,  the index does
have its drawbacks,  especially  problems  with urban/rural  comparisons.
Internal  coherence. The last three columns  of Table 1 compare  the average  asset
ownership  across  the poor, middle  and rich households. The index produces  sharp
differences  across  groups  in nearly  every asset:  clock ownership  is 16 percent  for the poor
versus  98 percent for the rich,  while the poor use biomass  (wood/dung/coal)  almost
exclusively  (96 percent)  only 22 percent of the rich do so. One question  is whether  the
asset index loads excessively  on variables  that are dependent  on locally  available
infrastructure  (electricity,  piped  water) rather  than household  specific  variables. On this
score  the clean  separation  between  poor and rich on non-infrastructure  variables,  for
example,  "all high quality  materials  in the dwelling"  (only .5 percent  of the poor versus
82.1  percent  of the rich)  and having  a kitchen  as a separate  room  (31 percent  of the poor
8versus 85 percent of the rich) is reassuring.
Robustness. The asset index produces very similar classifications when different
subsets of variables are used in its construction.  Table 2 reports the fraction of
households classifiled  in the bottom 40 when using all assets compared with indices based
on (1) only the ownership of  assets (watch, radio, etc....)  (2) the ownership of assets,
housing quality and number of rooms, and land ownership and (3) all the variables except
those related to drinking water and toilet facilities.  Almost no households classified in
the poorest group by the index using all variables would be classified as "rich" by any of
the more limited measures.  The robustness of the classification is similar for the middle
and rich groups.
Table 2:  Classification differences of the bottom 40 percent by asset index constructed
from different sets of variables: All India
Only 8 asset  Asset ownership,  'All variables  except  for
ownership  housing,  and land  drinking  water and toilet
variables  ownership  facilities
Groups  based  on  Bottom  40 pct.  80.24  87.72  95.08
asset index  Middle  40 pct.  19.70  12.28  4.92
using all  Top  20 pct.  0.06  0.00  0.00
variables  Total  100.00  100.00  100.00
Source:  Authors' calculations  from NFHS, 1992-93
Comparisons across states.  Since the poor, middle, and rich are defined on an all
India basis, states differ in the number of households in each group and hence we can
compare state by state rankings with conventional measures. Nationwide, the
expenditures poverty rate was 36 percent and hence is roughly comparable to the fraction
"asset poor" in the bottom forty percent by the asset index. The first and second columns
of Table 3 show the two classifications agree that Punjab, Haryana, and Kerala have
better than average economic status and that Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh are worse
than average.  The rank correlation of the poverty rate and the proportion asset poor is
9.794 (p-value<.001). There are differences: Maharashtra looks richer (27 percent asset
poor versus 37 percent poverty rate) and Andhra Pradesh looks poorer (39 percent asset
poor, but poverty rate of only 22 percent).
Table 3: Distribution of individuals across groups and state level poverty and net domestic
product (sorted by the percentage in the bottom 40 percent)




Goa  5.6  10128
Himachal Pradesh  6.8  28.58
Punjab  8.4  11.46  10857
Haryana  10.5  25.22  9609
Jammu  14.5
Kerala  15.1  25.12  5065
Mizoram  18.1
Nagaland  20.3
Gujarat  26.8  24.15  7586
Maharashtra  26.9  36.82  9270
Karnataka  27.6  32.91  6313
Manipur  27.6
Tamil Nadu  32.5  35.40  6205
Meghalaya  37.9  5769
Arunachal Pradesh  38.1  6359
Andhra Pradesh  39.0  21.87  5802
Rajasthan  39.7  27.46  5035
Tripura  41.8
West Bengal  44.3  36.94  5901
Uttar Pradesh  48.6  41.55  4280
Madhya Pradesh  49.4  42.46  4725
Orissa  54.4  48.64  3963
Assam  58.3  41.09  5056
Bihar  61.5  55.15  3280
All India  40.0  36.16  6380
.....................  ..... ..  ....  ........  ....  ...  ...  _...  ...........  ..........  . - - ----------  ----....  .........  ..... _.  ...  ..  ..........  . .-  ------  - --  ----
Notes: The rank correlation coefficient between the percent asset poor and the poverty rate is 0.794 (p-value <.001), the
rank correlation between the percent asset poor and per capita state product is -0.864 (p-value <.001).  Sources: NFHS,
1992/93 and Haque, Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1998, and Agrawal and Varma, 1996. Data on the Headcount Index are
for 1993/94.
The rank correlation of the proportion asset poor and SDP per capita, is -.864 (p-
value<.001).7 While the rankings agree overall, again certain states look different by the
two rankings.  For example, Kerala looks richer by the index (only 15 percent asset poor
The rank  correlation  between  the poverty  rate  and per-capita  state  domestic  product  is -.729 (p-value
=.002)
10with per capita SDP of 5065) while Assam looks poorer (58 percent asset poor) versus
per capita SDP of 5056.  However, the conventionally defined poverty rate agrees with
assets against SDP showing Assam poorer than in Kerala (41 versus 25 percent).
On the other hand  The first principal component explains 25.6 percent of the
variation in the twenty-one wealth variables, which is substantial, but not overwhelming.
While the first principal component of assets might well serve as a reasonable overall
index, a remaining question is whether the first component contains all of the relevant
information. The second principal component is more difficult to interpret, but it appears
to be capturing rich rural households.
This is particularly worrisome because the rankings by the asset index show rural
households to be less "wealthy" than do conventional poverty measures. One explanation
for this discrepancy is that since many of the asset variables depend on the availability of
infrastructure (electricity, piped water, sewerage), urban households are more likely to
appear well-off than poorer households.  On the other hand this may well imply that
standard poverty measures underestimate the difference between rural and urban
households by not adjusting real incomes for the implicit price differentials for services
provided by infrastructure. But back on the other hand,  for the analysis of enrollment
decisions we want an index that captures the dimensions of wealth relevant to education.
Finally, in this particular application we abandon all hands, mix metaphors, and punt: the
analysis below either uses rural only data or controls for rural/urban status so any level
difference due to systematic over or under statement of the differences should not affect
the analysis.
11II)  Asset index versus consumption expenditure as proxies for long-run wealth
Before using the asset index in an examination of the India educational data we
make a methodological detour and ask how the results are likely to compare to those
using more conventional rankings, such as by consumption expenditures.  In making the
comparison of an asset index and current expenditures we do not mean to imply that we
are creating an asset index intended to serve as a proxy for expenditures. 8 Rather, often
both are proxies for something unobserved: a household's long-run "wealth" or more
broadly "economic status".  Therefore, while it is reassuring that the two are related,
discrepancies in the classification of households cannot be assumed to be "mistakes" of
the asset index as they could just as easily be indicating limitations of current
consumption.  The two measures have conceptually distinct limitations.  The problem
with the asset index is not having appropriate weights for the assets. In contrast, the
problem with current expenditures (as a proxy) is that it would only be a perfect measure
for long-run wealth under the patently unrealistic assumption of perfect foresight and
perfect capital markets. 9
We address the comparison in two ways.  First, we use household survey data
It is in making this distinction that our approach most differs from Montgomery et al (1997) which is the
most comprehensive treatment of the issue of using asset variables in the DHS to date.  In their work
the issue is framed as an attempt to use the asset variables, or an asset index created from them, as  a
proxy for per-capita consumption.  That is, the quality of  any measure, or measures, used is assessed
from a diagnostic regression of consumption on the asset measure(s).  Moreover, their discussion on
the effect of asset variables on an outcome measure (e.g. child mortality) is about what this means for
inferences about the effect of consumption expenditures on the outcome.
9  The main reason why current expenditures is a popular proxy for long-run wealth are both the
theoretical justification that expenditures are superior to current income as a proxy for long-run
income because of consumption smoothing and, perhaps even more important, the pragmatic
justification that expenditures are easier to measure than income in most rural settings.  On neither of
these dimensions is current expenditures unambiguously preferred over asset ownership.
12from three countries and construct both an asset index and a consumption expenditures
based measure for the same households and compare classifications based on the two.'"
Second, we compare the relationship between enrollment rates and wealth using the asset
index and expenditures.
A)  Comparisons of consumption expenditures and asset index classifications
The Nepal Living Standards Survey carried out in 1996 (NLSS) and the Pakistan
Integrated Household Survey carried out in 1991 (PIHS) are "standard" Living Standards
Measurement Study (LSMS) Surveys (Grosh and Glewwe, 1998). The Indonesian DHS
carried out in 1994 (IDHS) included an experimental consumption expenditures module,
based closely on Indonesia's  SUSENAS survey, for about half of the households.
For each country we constructed a principal components assets index as well as
used (or derived) a measure of household size adjusted consumption expenditures.' 1"12
Individuals can be assigned to percentile based groups (bottom 40, middle 40, top 20)
using either the asset index or the expenditure measure.  Table 4 shows the results of
comparing the two classifications.  The results in Indonesia and Nepal are quite similar.
I0 We  compare  the  asset  index  to consumption  expenditures  and  not  predicted  consumption  expenditures,
where  assets  and  other  household  variables  are  used  as instruments.  While  some  of  the  results  would
appear  more  similar  if we had  taken  this  "best  practice"  approach  (recently  used  and  explored  in
Behrman  and  Knowles,  1997)  the  conventional  approach-particularly  for  bivariate/tabular
analysis-is  to not  use  predicted  expenditures  and  therefore  we  use  this  as our  baseline  for
comparison.
The  weights  on  the various  assets  are  reassuringly  similar  with  indices  for  the  three  countries:  e.g.  large
negative  weights  on  using  biomass  fuels,  large  weights  on  owning  a motorcycle  or scooter,  and large
weights  on quality  of housing  materials.
12 We  used  total  consumption  expenditures  (C)  adjusted  for  household  size  (N),  C/Na,  where  the
adjustment  for  economies  of scale cc  equals  0.6 (see  Lanjouw  and  Ravallion,  1995,  and  Dreze  and
Srinivasan,  1997,  for  discussions  of this  parameter).
13Roughly two-thirds of those claFsified into the bottom 40 by expenditures are also
classified into the bottom 40 by assets and only 5 percent of those in the bottom 40
percent by expenditures appear in the top 20 percent by assets. The classification of the
richest 20 shows less agreement; between 49 and 56 percent of those rich by expenditures
are also in the top 20 by assets, but 10 to 13 percent of those ranked in the top 20 by
expenditures are in the bottom 40 by assets.
Table 4:  Classification differences using asset index based groups and groups derived
from household consumption expenditures in Nepal, Indonesia, and Pakistan
Groups based on household consumption per adjusted size*
Nepal
Bottom 40 pct.  Top 20 pct.
Groups based on  Bottom 40 pct.  65.20  12.63
asset index  Middle 40 pct.  29.85  31.41
Top 20 pct.  4.95  55.96
Total  100.00  100.00
Indonesia
Bottom 40 pct.  Top 20 pct.
Groups based on  Bottom 40 pct.  63.91  10.43
asset index  Middle 40 pct.  31.58  41.06
Top 20 pct.  4.51  48.50
Total  100.00  100.00
Pakistan
Bottom 40 pct.  Top 20 pct.
Groups based on  Bottom 40 pct.  60.48  21.77
asset index  Middle 40 pct.  35.15  35.52
Top 20 pct.  4.37  42.71
Total  100.00  100.00
*Adjusted  household  size  is equal  to household  size  to the power  0.6.
Source:  Authors' calculations  from NLSS 1996,  IDHS, 1994,  and PIHS, 1991
The results for Pakistan show less coherence between the two rankings.  While it
is still the case that only 4 percent of those that are poor by expenditures are rich by
assets, only 60 percent of the expenditure poor are also asset poor.  Moreover, only 43
percent of those in the top 20 by expenditures are also in the top 20 by assets and 22
percent of the top 20 percent of households by expenditures are in the bottom 40 percent
14by assets.' 3
B) Compar  ison  of enrollment  rates using the two measures
The main purpose  of classifying  households  by economic  status  is to examine
what fraction  of children  in each  wealth group  is in school. Table 5 compares  differences
in enrollment  and completion  indicators  between  the rich and  poor groups  when  the
calculation  is done based on either  the asset index  or expenditures.
Table  5: Difference  between  the average  for the highest  20 percent  and the bottom  40 percent
of the outcome  indicators  using asset index and consumption  expenditures:  Nepal, Indonesia
and Pakistan
Percentage point difference between the  Based on  Based on  Difference between
top 20 and bottom 40 percent in:  Asset index  household  the asset index and




Ever went to school (ages 6 to 14)  41  40  1
Currently attending school (ages 6 to 14)  42  41  1
Completed at least grade 6 (ages 15 to 19)  48  49  -1
Indonesia
Ever went to school (ages 6 to 14)  10  7  3
Currently attending school (ages 6 to 14)  19  15  4
Completed at least grade 6 (ages 15 to 19)  23  16  7
Pakistan
Ever went to school (ages 6 to 14)  34  26  8
Currently attending school (ages 6 to 14)  33  26  7
Completed at least grade 6 (ages 15 to 19)  44  33  11
Source: Author's  calculations from IDHS 1994, NLSS 1996, PIHS, 1991
In Nepal the results  are almost  identical:  the proportion  of 6 to 14  year olds from
rich households  who ever  attended  is 41 percentage  points higher  than poor households
3 Many of the assets, lilke  the quality of materials, are at the household level and benefit all household
members so our asset index is unadjusted for household size.  Generally the fit between assets and
expenditure classifications is better the smaller a, so that the asset index classification fits total
household expenditures better than what is reported and fits per capita expenditures worse than is
reported.
15when defined by assets, and 40 percentage points higher for the rich than poor when
defined by expenditures.  In Pakistan in contrast, the gap in the proportion of 6 to 14 year
olds who ever attended school is 34 percentage points when rich and poor are defined
according to assets while there is a smaller rich-poor gap, 26 percentage points, when the
groups are defined on expenditures.  The Indonesian results are in between: the wealth
gap in current enrollment is 19 percentage points based on assets but only 15 percentage
points based on expenditures.  For all three countries classifying households by the asset
index consistently to produces a larger gap between the rich and the poor than classifying
households by expenditures.
Table 6: Difference in average enrollment rates between the richest 20 percent and the
poorest 20 percent using asset index and consumption based measures to derive
quintiles.
Difference between the enrollment rates of rural children  Difference between the asset
aged 6-14 from the top and bottom quintiles  index and consumption
when household quintiles are constructed by:  based
Per capita consumption  Classification
Asset index  expenditures
Andhra Pradesh  55  37  19
Assam  36  21  15
Bihar  67  43  25
Gujarat  46  27  19
Haryana  49  39  10
Karnataka  51  38  13
Kerala  12  3  9
Madhya Pradesh  55  33  22
Maharashtra  34  25  9
Orissa  47  38  10
Punjab  56  52  5
Rajasthan  52  41  11
Tamil Nadu  25  15  9
Uttar Pradesh  52  30  21
West Bengal  51  40  11
Source: Author's calculations from NFHS, 1992-93. Enrollment  for consumption  quintiles  from  Haque,
Lanjouw  and Ravallion,  1998
While we cannot compare the same households using Indian data, we can
compare averages for the NFHS data and the asset index with averages for Indian
National Sample Survey (NSS) data and per capita consumption expenditures (i.e. a=1,
16from Haque, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998).  Table 6 reports, for rural areas of each state,
the difference in the enrollment rate between the top and bottom quintiles.  The "flatter"
wealth-education profile found for rankings based on the consumption expenditures is
true for every state of India for which we can make the comparison.
C) Measurement error in proxies for long-run wealth
The first two columns of Table 7 show, by quintile, the fraction of children aged 6
to 14 in rural areas of India enrolled when children are classified by the asset index from
the NFHS data or by per capita consumption expenditures from the NSS data (Haque,
Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1998). While the enrollment rates for the middle quintile from
the two sources agree almost exactly (70 versus 71 percent), the enrollment rate profile
based on quintiles from household consumption expenditures from NSS data has a
"flatter" profile (from 49 to 82) than the profile based on an asset index.  The enrollment
of the poor is 7 percentage points lower (49 versus 42) using the assets index, while the
enrollment of the rich is 12 percentage points higher (94 versus 82).  Therefore the raw
"wealth gap" in emnollment  rates is 33 percentage points with consumption expenditures
but 52 percentage points using the asset index.
The last three columns of Table 7 display a hypothetical calculation of the effect
of measurement error on the wealth-enrollment profile.  Using plausible values for the
degree of measurement error of either measure as a proxy for long-run wealth either from
assets or the magnitude of transitory component in consumption expenditures one can
find substantial effects in "flattening" the enrollment/wealth profile.  As is to be expected
the larger measurement error in relation to the "true" variation of income the "flatter" the
17enrollIment-income  profile and the lower the differences between quintiles.  Even if  the
"true" wealth-gap were 60 points then a modest amount of measurement error would
reduce the observed gap to 51 and substantial measurement error would reduce the gap
further still.
Table 7:  Enrollment rates by quintile, household per capita consumption and asset index
and an illustration of the attenuation effects of measurement error.
Enrollment  of rural  children  aged  Hypothetical  enrollment  profile
6-14 when  household  quintiles  when  the noise to total (noise
are constructed  by:  plus signal)  ratio is:
Quintile:  Per capita  Asset index  Assumed  20 percent  50 percent
consumption  true profile
expenditures
1  49  42  ~~~~~~~~40  45  50
2  61  58  55  57  61
3  70  71  70  70  70
4  ~~~~~~~76  84  85  83  79
5  82  94  100  96  90
Difference
between  33  52  60  51  40
quintiles  5 and I
Source: Enrollment  by consumption  quintiles  from Haque,  Lanjouw  and  Ravallion,  1998,  final columns
from Monte  Carlo simulations.
Some  additional  insight  about  the role of measurement  error comes  from a
heuristic  use  of regression  analysis.'1 4 We use two approaches  to exploring  the relative
amounts  of measurement  error in the two  variables:  instrumental  variables (IV) and
reverse  regression.  Under  the hypothesis  that expenditures  and  the asset index are both
proxies  for long-run  wealth  and that the measurement  error of each is not perfectly
correlated  then  each proxy  can be used as an instrument  for the other to mitigate  the
measurement  error attenuation  bias.  The ratio of OLS  to IV estimates  is an estimate  of
14We  call  these  regressions "heuristic" as we are estimating extremely simplified linear probability
models  including  only  dummy  variables  for urban  residence  and male gender  as controls  to examine
the issue of measurement error.
1  8the relative signal to signal plus noise for the two variables.  The lower the ratio the worse
the variable is as a proxy for predicting enrollments. This is true even if the measurement
error in expenditures and assets is correlated and hence neither of the IV estimates is
consistent.  The degree of inconsistency in the IV estimates depends only on the
measurement error common to both measures and hence IV estimates for both
expenditures and assets will converge to the same number.  In contrast, the degree of
inconsistency in the OLS depends on both the conrmon and the indicator specific
measurement error. Hence the ratio of the ratio of OLS to IV for each measure is a valid
indicator of the relative degree of measurement error.
In Nepal, when we regress current enrollment on the asset index using
consumption as an instrument, the ratio of the OLS to IV estimates is 0.66, while when
we regress enrollment on the consumption measure using the asset index as an
instrument, the ratio of the OLS to IV estimates is 0.46, yielding a ratio of the two of 1.4
(Table 8). '5  In Indonesia and Pakistan, when we regress current enrollment on the asset
index and use constunption expenditures as an instrument, the ratio of the OLS to IV
estimate is 0.85 in Indonesia and 1.00 in Pakistan.  When we regress enrollment on the
consumption measure using the asset index as an instrument, the ratio of the OLS to IV
estimates is 0.16 in Indonesia and 0.15 in Pakistan, yielding a ratio of the ratios of 5.3 and
1  Behrman  and Knowles  (1997)  find that  their estimates  of the elasticities  of various  education  outcome
measures  with  respect  to income,  or consumption  expenditures,  in Vietnam  increase  by between  50 to
60 percent  when  they use household  assets  and other  household  characteristics  as instruments  for
consumption.  In the India  case we do not have  expenditures,  but we do have 21 assets. So we divided
the asset variables  into two  groups  and constructed  an asset index  out of each set to form  repeat
measurements  on long-run  wealth. While  both  of these  will be imperfect  proxies for long-run  wealth,
the measurement  errors  will not be perfectly  correlated  and hence  each can be used as an instrument
for the other.  In this case  the ratio of OLS  to IV estimates  of around 1/2  is an estimate  of the variance
196.7 respectively. 16
An alternative approach to measurement error is to use reverse regression for the
bivariate relationships.  That is, regress enrollment on the wealth measure and estimate
the coefficient  on wealth  (n), then regress  the wealth  measure  on enrollment  and estimate
the coefficient on enrollment (6).  If enrollment and wealth are measured with error then
the true regression parameter is bounded by f (which is biased towards zero because of
attenuation bias) and 1/6 (which is biased away from zero as 6 is biased towards zero
because of attenuation bias).
A comparison of the ratio of ,B  and 1/6 when using the asset index and when using
expenditures again estimates the relative measurement error in the two variables (as
whatever measurement error is in enrollment is the same for the two analyses).  In Nepal
the reverse regression yields an estimate which is 12 times higher than the direct
regression when using the asset index and 15 times higher when using expenditures,
yielding a ratio of 1.3 (Table 8). This is very close to the ratio of 1.4 from the IV
approach.  In Indonesia the reverse regression estimate is 20 times higher for the asset
index and 56 times higher for consumption, and for Pakistan the numbers are 15 and 111,
yielding ratios of 2.9 and 7.2 respectively-again  very comparable to the IV results.
The results in Table 8 are all the stronger when compared to those in Table 5
which showed that the gap in the probability of enrollment between the bottom 40
of the "true" to the total variance.  The wealth index appears to have a substantial measurement error
component.
16  The would indicate an extraordinary degree of measurement error in Indonesia and Pakistan's
consumption expenditure data.  In Pakistan this is consistent with the fact that the R-squared of
regressing consumption expenditures on the assets in Montgomery et al (1997) is only .13 in Pakistan
20percent and the top 20 percent was larger when households are ranked by the asset index,
and that the difference was smallest in Nepal and largest in Pakistan.  For current
enrollment of children 6 to 14, the difference using the alternative ways of ranking
households in the gap was 1 in Nepal, 4 in Indonesia, and 7 in Pakistan: not only is the
ordering the same but the magnitudes are consistent.
Table 8: Enrollment as a function of the asset index or consumption expenditures: Alternative
estimates of relative measurement error of expenditures versus asset index.
IV method  Reverse regression method
OLS to IV  OLS to IV  Ratio of  Reverse to  Reverse to  . Ratio of
ratio: Asset  ratio: Cons.  ratios  direct ratio:  direct ratio:  ratios
Indexa  Expend.b  Asset  Cons.
Index c  Expend.d
Nepal  0.66  0.46  1.4  11.9  15.2  1.3
Indonesia  0.85  0.16  5.3  19.6  56.4  2.9
Pakistan  1.00  0.15  6.7  15.4  111.0  7.2
Note:  (a) (pAIOLS  /pAlIV)  (b) (pICEOLS  /CEIV)  (c) (AIoLs  /p4*AILS) (d) (pCEoLs /jj*CE0Ls)
Where ,B  is the coefficient on the asset index or consumption in a regression of enrollment on the asset index or consumption,
and ,B*  is the inverse of the coefficient on enrollment in the (reverse) regression of the asset index or consumption on
enrollment.  Source: Author's  calculations from IDHS 1994, NLSS 1996, PIHS, 1991
D) Stability over time of household rankings
All of these results are consistent with much less "noise" in an asset index than in
consumption expenditures-as  a proxy for long-run wealth.  We wish to stress that our
discussion of "measurement error" in consumption expenditures needs to be understood
not as a statement about error in the measurement of actual current consumption, rather in
the measurement of an indicator for use as a determinant of educational outcomes.  These
are likely to be much less sensitive to transitory fluctuations in expenditures and therefore
one explanation of the "superior" performance of the asset index is that household
rankings based on this index are more stable than those based on a consumption measure.
versus  .22 or above iin  three other countries they report (in addition to our result of .24 for Nepal).  It
is less consistent with the R-square being equal to .33 in Indonesian DHS.
21A panel survey of households in Morocco from 1992 to 1995 provides the basis to
explore this issue. A DHS survey in 1992 covered 6407 households and a 1995 survey
covered 2751, of which 2489 households can be matched across surveys. Table 9
presents the classification differences across the two time periods for the subsample of
overlapping households.'7 For example, 78.4 percent of the households who are
classified as being in the poorest quintile in 1992 are also in the poorest quintile in 1995,
and essentially none (1.3 percent) move out of the bottom 40 percent.
Table 9: Classification differences using asset index derived from two samples (with
overlap) in Morocco.
Quintiles  based  on 1995  ranking
1  2  3  4  5  Total
. ...  ..  _  ~~~~..  _  . ...........  . ...... _......  ..  ......_._...  ..  ----  ----  ................................................  - -..  ....  ....  .............................. Quintiles  1  78.4  20.3  1.1  0.2  0.0  100.0
based  on  2  26.6  53.9  19.5  0.0  0.0  100.0
1992  ranking  3  2.8  24.5  54.7  13.6  4.5  100.0
4  0.0  2.5  15.7  58.4  23.4  100.0
5  0.0  0.0  3.1  32.6  64.2  100.0
Source:  Authors' calculations  from Morocco  DHS,  1992  and 1995.
In a recent survey, Fields (1998) reports a similar analysis of stability of
classifications based on expenditures for four countries.  Table 10 summarizes the results
on changes in household rankings from these studies. These results clearly show more
variability over time for the income or consumption expenditure based classifications
than the results for Morocco using the asset based measure, particularly for the poorest
quintile.  However, a major caveat here is that the Morocco panel spans only 3 years
which is the shortest time span for all the countries compared.
17Households  are classified in each time period according to their position with respect to the entire sample
not just the subsample that can be matched over time.
22Table 10: Stability over time in rankings, comparison from panel data sets.
Percent  in the  Percent  in the
Country  Start  End  Diffe  Variable  used to rank  poorest  quintile  richest  quintile  who
year  year  rence  households  (individuals)  who stay in the  stay in the richest
_______  ______  poorest quintile  quintile
Morocco  1992  1995  3  Household  asset  index  78  64
Malaysia  1967  1976  9  Income  of males  55  62
Chile  1968  1986  18  Per capita  household  income  8  58
China  (rural)  1978  1983  5  Household  income  54  61
1983  1989  6  Household  income  41  49
Lima,  Peru  1985  1990  5  P.C. household  consumption  40  50
Source:  Adapted  from Fields  (1998)  and authors' calculations  from Morocco  DHS 1992  and 1995.
Based on a recent six year panel of households in China, Jalan and Ravallion
(forthcoming) find that annual consumption expenditures have a high degree of
variability.  In particular, they find that the average standard deviation of consumption
per person across households is 384 (the mean is 342 Yuan per person per year at 1985
prices over the period 1985-90) and that the mean of the intertemporal standard deviation
for any given household, over the entire period, is 189. So the standard deviation of a
household's measured expenditures over time is about half that in the cross-section which
will imply substantial changes in the classification across years.
Methodological summary so far
In some ways we are standing the conventional wisdom exactly on its head. The
conventional wisdom is that survey based household consumption expenditures are the
best estimates, not only of current expenditures, but are also the best proxy for
households long-run wealth, while surveys without consumption expenditures have
limited value, as they cannot control for, or estimate, wealth impacts.  However, there is
no a priori argument as to why current consumption expenditures are a better proxy of
long-run household economic status than an index of assets: it is an open empirical
23question. Our results suggest that a methodologically simple solution to the vexing
problem of creating a weighted index, using the technique of principal components,
works.  Rather then being an ad hoc embarrassment the asset index appears to be more
stable, less contaminated with measurement error as a measure of long-run wealth, and
hence predicts enrollment differences better than traditional consumption expenditures.
This obviously has important implications for the uses of the DHS and NFHS data sets to
examine a broad range of indicators.
III)  Wealth gaps in educational outcomes in Indian states.
Armed with data on educational outcomes on the one hand and the newly
constructed and (elaborately) defended proxy for wealth on the other, we now address
how the enrollments and attainment of children differ within Indian states according to
the economic status of the household, and controlling for that, how enrollment is affected
by gender, location, and the presence of schools.
A)  Descriptive statistics: raw wealth gap
Overall only 68 percent of children aged 6 to 10 and 66 percent of those aged 11
to 14 are reported as being in school.'8 As is well known, educational enrollments and
attainments vary widely across Indian states. The percentage of 6 to 10 year olds in
school ranges from only 50 percent in Bihar to 96 percent in Kerala, and the percentage
18  This is dramatically less than would be suggested from official government enrollment data, a
discrepancy explored extensively in a recent World Bank book on basic education in India (World
Bank, 1997). The present analysis focuses on differences in enrollments across groups (wealth,
gender) and therefore these differences in absolute levels are less relevant.
24of those 11 to 14 in school ranges from 54 percent in Bihar to 94 percent in Kerala and
Mizoram.  The percentage of adults 15 to 65 who have ever attended school ranges from
42 percent in Bihar to 93 percent in Mizoram, and has a national average of 55 percent.
Average years of attainmnent  of those who even attended to school, ranges much less than
enrollments and is close to 8 years of schooling in all states (except Delhi).
Figure I shows the "attainment profiles" for those aged 15 to 19: each state
specific graph shows the attainment of children who live in poor, middle, and rich
households.  The attainment profile shows the proportion of children who have completed
any given grade or higher. The gap between 1 and the intercept shows the proportion
who never enrolled (or more specifically, never completed grade 1) while the slope
indicates the percenitage  of children who drop out across the years.  Table 11 shows
whether a child is enrolled and the probability a child aged 15 to 19 completed grade 8
classified by the household's asset index.'9
Both Figure 1 and Table 11 show clearly that children from richer households do
better in all states. On average 94 percent of children aged 6 to 14 from the upper 20
percent are in school.  This high enrollment rate of the rich is remarkably consistent
across states, it is above 90 percent in all but three states (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and
Tripura). Moreover, in all states, when children from rich households enroll, they stay in
school. The enrollrnent profiles for the richest group are virtually flat between grades 1
and 5 in all states, and only slightly decreasing between grades 5 and 8.  This
1  Because the economic groups are based on the all India sample, there are sometimes very few
observations from which to derive the numbers displayed here.  When the number of observations for
any subgroup drops below 40 the attainment profile is not shown. For example in Delhi  there are
25combination results in over 70 percent of 15 to 19 year olds from the richest economic
group completing grade 8 in all but two states (Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh).
In sharp contrast, among the poorer part of the population educational attainment
is dismal.  Only half of the children aged 6 to 14 are in school.  Moreover, the profiles
suggest in several states (for example, Assam, Gujarat, Orissa, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu,
and West Bengal) that on top of a low proportion having completed grade 1, dropout is
high leading to an even lower proportion who complete grade 5, and a substantially lower
proportion for grade 8.  Overall, only 38 percent of children aged 15 to 19 from the poor
households finished grade 5.  Only one in five poor children finished eight years of basic
education.
The gap in educational enrollment and attainment between the rich and poor is
enormous, but it also varies a great deal across states.  The wealth gap in "ever enrolled"
varies from a minor 9 percentage points in Kerala to a substantial 56 percentage points in
Bihar. The gap in the attainment of grade 8 varies from (a non-negligible) 39 percentage
points in Kerala to 72 percentage points in Orissa.
very  few observation  in the lowest  economic  group  and therefore  the proportion  is not reported  for
that group.
26Figure  1: Attainment  profiles for ages 15 to 19, by economic group
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27Table 11: Basic statistics on education status by wealth group (states sorted by average
enrollment rate)
Proportion of 6 to  14 year olds who are  Proportion of 15 to 19 year olds who have
currently "in school"  completed at least grades 8
Wealth
State  Average  Bottom  Top 20  Wealth  Bottom  Top  gap (top-
40  percent  gap  All  40  20  bottom)
percent  (top - percent  percent
bottom)
Kerala  0.949  0.887  0.975  0.088  0.749  0.531  0.923  0.392
Goa  0.937  0.774  0.973  0.200  0.703  0.344  0.848  0.504
Himachal Pradesh  0.908  0.724  0.970  0.246  0.565  0.233  0.818  0.585
Mizoram  0.907  0.768  0.974  0.205  0.567  0.190  0.844  0.654
Manipur  0.902  0.804  0.991  0.186  0.610  0.359  0.927  0.568
Nagaland  0.896  0.824  0.980  0.157  0.572  0.354  0.865  0.511
Delhi  0.872  0.477  0.924  0.448  0.685  . 0.766
Jammu  0.857  0.666  0.979  0.313  0.541  0.195  0.833  0.638
Tamil Nadu  0.825  0.717  0.950  0.232  0.518  0.269  0.838  0.570
Maharashtra  0.820  0.671  0.962  0.290  0.579  0.279  0.832  0.554
Haryana  0.813  0.605  0.957  0.352  0.480  0.189  0.728  0.539
Punjab  0.808  0.427  0.957  0.531  0.571  0.153  0.777  0.624
Tripura  0.795  0.710  0.873  0.163  0.395  0.187  0.789  0.603
Gujarat  0.757  0.552  0.962  0.410  0.504  0.212  0.845  0.633
Meghalaya  0.749  0.601  0.959  0.358  0.326  0.150  0.667  0.516
Arunachal Pradesh  0.711  0.585  0.865  0.279  0.340  0.184  0.585  0.400
Karnataka  0.708  0.507  0.943  0.437  0.447  0.205  0.816  0.611
Assam  0.703  0.615  0.846  0.231  0.422  0.229  0.866  0.637
Orissa  0.697  0.552  0.969  0.416  0.395  0.189  0.908  0.719
West Bengal  0.678  0.527  0.902  0.375  0.338  0.137  0.734  0.597
Andhra Pradesh  0.639  0.457  0.917  0.460  0.419  0.160  0.859  0.698
Madhya Pradesh  0.626  0.461  0.937  0.476  0.367  0.172  0.832  0.661
Uttar Pradesh  0.614  0.484  0.939  0.455  0.424  0.239  0.836  0.598
Rajasthan  0.593  0.414  0.91  0.496  0.345  0.141  0.773  0.632
Bihar  0.514  0.378  0.942  0.564  0.381  0.183  0.864  0.681
All India  0.677  0.500  0.942  0.442  0.447  0.204  0.824  0.620
Source: Calculated from NFHS data, 1992-93
The implication of the small differences among the rich and huge differences for
the poor in enrollment and attainment across Indian states means that gaps are largely
driven by the extent to which states have been able to reach the bottom part of the
economic distribution and bring them into the educational system.  For instance, Tamil
Nadu and Rajasthan are not that different in the percent of the households asset poor:  37
percent in Tamil Nadu and 43 percent in Rajasthan.  However, their average educational
attainment is quite different: only 52 percent of 15 to 19 year olds completed grade 5 in
28Rajasthan as compared to 74 percent in Tamil Nadu.  What causes this large difference?
In both states the attainment of grade 5 by the rich is high, 96 percent in Tamil Nadu
versus 90 percent in Rajasthan.  What differs is how likely the poor are to reach grade 5.
While in Tamil Nadu 52 percent of the poor population reached grade 5, this was only
true of 29 percent cf the poor in Rajasthan, a gap between the two states of 23 percentage
points.
B)  Estimation of wealth effects with child, household, village and state controls
To disentangle the determinants of school enrollment, we now estimate a probit
regression with the dependent variable of whether or not the child aged 6 to 14 is enrolled
in school:
E i  l=2,5  fij x  Qij  +  (o  XXj  +  Zk-2,25 
6 k  X  Xik  +  £  j
The wealth effects are specified by including the Q; s which are dummy variables equal to
one if child i is in quintilej  (the reference quintile is the poorest group).
In all of the samples the variables included besides wealth (Xi) are: the child
variables of a dummy variable for gender, child's age and age squared, the household
variables of age of the head of the household, whether the household head ever attended
school, the highest grade completed of the household head, whether the household is
Hindu, whether the household is from a scheduled caste or tribe. 20 Last, the specification
includes a set of dummy variables Xik equal to one if child i lives in state k.
20  If the information on the education of the head of the household is missing  we set the head ever
attended school and head's highest grade variables to zero and set an indicator dummy variable equal
to one in the regression.
29The other variables present (in the set of X1s) depend on whether the sample
includes urban and rural households or is limited to rural areas (the data on school
availability and other village characteristics is limited to rural areas). In the pooled
urban/rural samples a dummy variable is included for urban location of the household.  In
the sample with rural areas only the variables include three dummy variables for the
presence of (1) a primary school, (2) a primary and a "middle" school, and (3)  a primary,
"middle" and a secondary school.  In addition a large set of other village level variables
capturing village infrastructure is included (e.g. post-office, bank, cinema house).
Table 12 reports the estimation of the equation for the all India sample for the
combined urban and rural and for the rural only samples. The results show that there is a
strong wealth effect in the probability of enrollment.  All else equal, a child from a
household in the highest quintile is about 31 percentage points more likely to be in school
than a child from the poorest quintile. Moreover, the effects are strictly ordered across
the quintiles: being in the second quintile increases the probability of being in school by
10 percentage points and each subsequent quintile increases the probability by roughly 7
percentage points (10.3 to 16.9 to 24.1 to 30.7).
The results on wealth for rural areas only, where a host of additional village level
factors are included in the model are included, are very similar.  In particular, the rural
sample includes information on school availability so these wealth effects represent the
effects of wealth, even when controlling for the fact that the poor are more likely to live
in villages without schools.  Even with these additional controls the magnitude of the
wealth effects are nearly identical to those in the all India sample (11. 1, 18.5, 26.9, and
31.5).
30Table 12: Marginal effects on the probability of being "in school" for ages 6 to 14,
(Probit regression results)
All India (urban and rural)  Rural only
Zero /  Marginal Effect  T-ratio  Marginal Effect  T-ratio
one
variable
Quintile 2a  *  0.103  12.32  0.111  9.87
Quintile 3  *  0.169  16.94  0.185  17.92
Quintile 4  *  0.241  22.55  0.269  20.77
Quintile 5  *  0.307  23.53  0.315  18.69
Male  *  0.237  8.42
Rural maleb  *  0.070  3.85
Urban Female  *  -0.107  -6.19
Rural Female  *  -0.149  -6.70
Scheduled caste  Scheduled tribe  *  -0.047  -3.87  -0.053  -4.37
Age  0.206  13.37  0.232  13.20
Age squared  -0.011  -16.89  -0.012  -16.47
Head is male  *  -0.092  -5.64  -0.119  -5.90
Head's age  0.001  4.29  0.002  5.41
Head ever attended school  *  0.072  6.73  0.071  6.88
Head's highest grade completed  0.019  16.27  0.023  19.31
Head information missing  *  0.094  4.42  0.112  4.75
Hindu  *  0.109  5.11  0.119  5.38
Primary school in village  *  0.037  2.10
Primary and middle school in vill.  *  0.073  3.05
Primary, middle, and secondary in vill.  *  0.083  6.43
Nearest town within 5km  *  0.018  1.31
Nearest railroad within 5 km  *  -0.001  -0.11
Nearest bus within 5 km  *  0.014  1.71
Paved road in village  *  0.006  0.42
Electricity in village  *  0.019  1.10
PHC clinic in village  *  -0.006  -0.27
Health subcenter in village  *  -0.011  -1.09
Hospital in village  *  -0.015  -1.00
Dispensary in village  *  0.001  0.11
Health guide in village  *  0.001  0.05
Bank in village  *  0.009  0.92
Co-op in village  *  0.007  0.55
Post-office in village  *  -0.009  -0.60
Market in village  *  -0.021  -2.95
Cinema house in village  *  0.003  0.31
Pharmacy in village  *  0.016  1.15
Mahila Mandal  *  -0.022  -1.01
Flood within the last two years  *  -0.003  -0.22
Drought in the last two years  *  -0.007  -0.56
Notes: The marginal effect for a zero/one variable is the effect of a change in the variable from zero to one on the
probability of a child being in school. The specification includes dummy variables for each state, see Table 12. T-
ratios refer to the underlying probit coefficient. a/ Reference group is quintile I (poorest). b/ Reference group is urban
male.
The regressions are estimated separately for each state and then for India as a
whole.  The all-India regressions include dummy variables for each state (with Bihar as
the reference state).  Instead of presenting the complete set of equations for each of the 25
31states and India as a whole, we first report the all-India results for each of the samples
(Table 12) and then report just the wealth effects by state (Table 13). A companion paper
delves more deeply into the interpretation of the other variables in the Indian context,
including an examination of gender impacts and an exploration of the state specific
effects (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998b).
Table 13 presents the marginal effects of being in each quintile on the probability
a child aged 6 to 14 will be in school when the effects are estimated state by state in the
pooled and rural only samples. While the effects are large on average, there is a
substantial amount of variation across states in the magnitude of the wealth effects.  For
example, a child from the highest quintile in Kerala is about 5 percentage points more
likely than one from the poorest quintile to be in school, whereas in Bihar the difference
is 43 percentage points. 2"  Focusing on rural areas only exacerbates the differences with
the Kerala-Bihar difference in the wealth gap going from 4 in Kerala to 53 percentage
points in Bihar.
21  Recall  that the quintiles  are based  on the all India  sample  so that the highest  quintile  in each state refers
to the same  level  of wealth.
32Table 13: Marginal effects of wealth on the probability of being in school for ages 6 to 14,
urban and rural (Probit regression results for selected variables).  States sorted by the "quintile
5" coefficient in the rural sample.
Pooled urban and rural samples  Rural sample only
Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5
.......  .. .......... S..  _  _ ...... _.......,....  ............  ...  .......  ...  ...  ...  . .........  . . . . . . . . . . ------  -.......  ...  . --- -.-  .-  I  - --------..-------  ------------
Mizoramn  0.030  0.073  0.112  0.083  -0.012  i  0.026 i  0.018  i  -0.096 i
Himachal Pradesh  -0.035 i  0.031 i  0.045  i  0.062  i  -0.086  i  0.005 i  0.013  i  0.026 i
Kerala  0.017 i  0.038  0.059  0.046  0.014 i  0.037  0.058  0.042
Goa  0.019 i  0.042  0.064  0.098  0.024 i  0.038  0.063  0.054
Nagaland  -0.004 i  0.027 i  0.017 i  0.064  0.001 i  0.037  i  0.007 i  0.065 i
Manipur  0.032 i  0.055  0.085  0.073  0.037  0.049  0.095  0.095
jammu  0.039 i  0.079  0.146  0.160  0.028 i  0.066  0.118  0.119
TamilNadu  0.006  i  0.061  0.106  0.143  -0.001  i  0.078  0.119  0.142
Tripura  0.080  0.115  0.138  0.079 i  0.066  0.136  0.137  0.155
Delhi  0.055  i  0.072  i  0.115  0.446  0.087  0.160
Maharashtra  0.048  0.084  0.124  0.199  0.049  0.093  0.163  0.164
Assam  0.131  0.202  0.212  0.133  0.139  0.212  0.187  0.172
lHaryana  0.072  0.093  0.186  0.234  0.084  i  0.107  0.229  0.196
Arunachal Pradesh  0.137  0.215  0.239  0.242  0.121  0.217  0.226  0.212
Orissa  0.082  0.206  0.231  0.263  0.095  0.229  0.250  0.251
lIeghalaya  0.011 i  0.081  0.188  0.197  0.011 i  0.083  i  0.209  0.257
Gujarat  0.057  0.106  0.179  0.294  0.066  0.145  0.210  0.273
West Bengal  0.152  0.242  0.290  0.271  0.124  0.226  0.287  0.284
Punjab  0.035  i  0.104  0.207  0.336  0.022  i  0.110  0.246  0.286
Karnataka  0.088  0.185  0.253  0.296  0.074  0.191  0.267  0.303
MadhyaPradesh  0.121  0.198  0.268  0.348  0.135  0.220  0.297  0.371
UttarPradesh  0.135  0.188  0.271  0.382  0.152  0.196  0.282  0.372
Andhra Pradesh  0.077  0.151  0.261  0.322  0.083  0.126  0.270  0.387
Rajasthan  0.082  0.158  0.296  0.388  0.065  0.180  0.339  0.406
Bihar  0.150  0.248  0.400  0.426  0.167  0.255  0.425  0.526
All India  0.103  0.169  0.241  0.307  0.111  0.185  0.269  0.315
Sourc:  NFHS 1992-93
Notes: All underlying probit coefficients for displayed variables are significant except those indicated by "i".  Marginal
effects are evaluated at the means of the other variables.  In addition to the displayed variables, the probit regression includes
age, age squared; gender, age, and schooling of the head of the household; a dummy for Hindu.  The regression for the rural
sample includes dummy variables for village infrastructure (for example for the presence of a paved road, a PHC clinic, a
post office, a marketshop).  All India regression includes dummy variables for state (see Table 12).
The results found here are consistent with those from other studies.  For example,
NCAER (1994) found that the difference in the percent of children aged 6 to 14 years old
who had ever attended school between children from households with per capita incomes
of less than Rs3,000 and children from households with per capita incomes of more than
RslO,000 was 25 percentage points, in an average taken over 14 major states.  The range
in the difference was smallest in Kerala where there was no difference found, and largest
33in Punjab where it was 55 percentage points.  Haque, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998) find
similar differences across the quintiles in the raw enrollment rates (see Table 7).
Moreover, in a regression on enrollment in their data, the coefficient of (log) per capita
consumption in explaining enrollment is  0. 178. If we apply this response to the
percentage difference in average consumption between the highest and lowest per capita
quintiles in India, the result is very close to what we get if we use the estimates in Table
12.22
Last, Behrman and Knowles (1997) review estimates on the income elasticity of
educational attainment from many different countries (summarized in Table 14).  These
are not strictly comparable as they are elasticities of attainment, not enrollment
probabilities but the elasticity for the poorer countries is consistent with an estimate of
close to 0. 18.
Table 14: Estimates of the elasticity of schooling outcomes with respect to incomes
Country  _____  Year  Outcome  measure  Elasticity
Ghana  1987/9  School  attainment  0.18-0.56*
Nepal  1980/1  Grade  attainment  0.38*
Bangladesh  1980/1  Attendance  0.20
Pakistan  1989  Numeracy and literacy  0.05-0.23*
Cote d'lvoire  1985/7  School attainment  0.14-0.42*
Bolivia  1989  Grade attained  0.04*
Nicaragua  1977/8  Grades completed  0.02-0.07
Brazil  1970  Completed years  0.09-0.16*
Brazil  1982  Completed years  0.06-0.22*
Venezuela  1987  Years  0.01  *
Taiwan  1989  Years of schooling  0.12-0.33*
Source: Adapted from Behrman and Knowles (1997)
Notes: * indicates that the underlying estimate was significant at the 10 percent level.  Country/years are
sorted by PPP per capita GDP.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly explore the causes behind
22  For example, if the difference in average per-capita consumption between the richest and poorest
quintiles is 139 percent, then a marginal effect estimate of 0.178 implies a 25 (139x0.178) percentage
34the differences in enrollment and attainment across wealth groups, there are some
important implications from this analysis. Foremost, it is clear that a simple theoretical
model where household wealth and child education outcomes are unrelated is not
consistent with the evidence. Such theoretical models, which generally assume that
education is a pure investment, households are perfectly inter-generationally linked, the
returns to education are randomly distributed across the population, and credit markets
are perfect are per]haps  more useful as an organizing framework for the ways reality
differs from these assumptions.
The theory can break down on each of the assumptions, explored more thoroughly
in Behrman and Knowles (1997).  Education has a consumption (i.e. non-investment)
component and richer households will consume more of it.  Children from poor
households face lower returns (either in reality or in perception) to schooling and hence
invest smaller amounts in it. Access to credit on the basis of future potential returns to
schooling may be difficult for all but especially for the poor and therefore they can
finance less of it. 23
IV) Conclusions
In this paper we show that the impact of wealth on enrollment can be estimated
without income or expenditure data-without  apologies or tears-using  household asset
point  difference  in  the enrollment  rates. This  compares  to our all India  estimate  of 31 percentage
points  difference  between  the poorest  and richest  quintiles  of the wealth index.
23 Although  credit  constraints  are often  put forward  as explaining  differences  in education  across  wealth
groups,  our findings  cast some  doubt on their importance. Since  the gaps we identify  are not only
large  but highly  variable  across  states,  any theory  that rested  on capital  market  imperfections  would
have  to explain  this  cross-state  variability  in access  to credit  of the poorest  part of the population.
35variables.  The use of principal components provides a set of methodologically simple yet
defensible weights to create an index of assets which proxies for long-run wealth.  In the
four countries examined, India, Indonesia, Nepal, and Pakistan, this approach produces
remarkably reasonable results.  Education outcome differentials and wealth groups are
more strongly related when the asset index, rather than a conventional consumption
expenditures based measure, is used as a proxy for long-run wealth.  This is consistent
with there being less measurement error in the asset measure relative to the expenditures
based measure as a proxy for long-run wealth.
The ability to generate wealth groups which are useful for analyzing educational
outcomes in a consistent methodological manner using DHS-like data opens up a host of
possibilities for data analysis even when income or consumption expenditures are not
collected.  For example, Filmer and Pritchett (1998a) explore how educational attainment
profiles differ across wealth groups in the 3  5 countries that have had a recent DHS
survey.  Similar country specific (or comparative) analyses can be carried out for a wider
range of socio-economic indicators included in the DHS such as health outcomes,
fertility, and family planning usage for example.
When the asset index is applied to the Indian data the results show large wealth
gaps in the enrollment of children which vary widely across states of India.  While on
average across India a rich (top 20 percent of the asset index) child is 31 percentage
points more likely to be enrolled than a poor (bottom 40 percent), this rati6 varies from a
wealth gap of only 4.6 in Kerala, to 38.2 in Uttar Pradesh and 42.6 percentage points in
Bihar.
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